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ABSTRACT
This study examines the effect of dividend tax changes on the share 
prices and corporate policies of Malaysian REITs. Event study results 
show that dividend tax cut announcements provide positive abnormal 
returns. Based on cross-sectional regression, the abnormal returns 
are found to be larger for REITs with a higher retail ownership. The 
implementation of dividend tax cuts also increases dividend payout 
and reduce investment activities. These results partly support the 
traditional view of dividend taxation which posits that tax reform could 
affect economic efficiency and resource allocation in an economy.
1. Introduction
Little has been written about the impact of dividend tax changes on share prices and cor-
porate policies. This is because major changes in dividend tax rates are rare and often 
confounded with other non-dividend changes announcements. A number of papers have 
used Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 in the US as a laboratory test 
to examine the impact of dividend tax cuts on firm value and corporate decisions (see 
Amromin, Harrison, Liang, & Sharpe, 2005; Auerbach & Hassett, 2005; Edgerton, 2010). 
The 2003 Act signed by President George W. Bush on 28 May 2003 was aimed to reduce 
the maximum statutory personal tax rate on dividends from 38.1 to 15% and capital gain 
rate of 20–15%.
We aim to shed light into this area of research by focusing on Malaysia REITs sector 
that experienced temporary dividend tax cuts announced during the presentations of the 
national budget by the Malaysian prime minister in 2006, 2008 and 2011. The impact of 
such policy is expected to benefit both local and foreign investors as well as help to increase 
the growth of this sector. As shown in Table 1, foreign (include individuals) and domestic 
institutional investors are the main beneficiaries of these tax cuts. This group of investors 
saw their dividend tax rate reduced from 28% in 2006 to 10% in 2009; while the impact of 
dividend tax cuts on domestic individual investors would depend on their personal income 
tax bracket. Individuals with taxable income of at least RM35,000 saw their marginal tax 
rate from investing in REITs reduce from 13 to 10% while those earning below this number 
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experienced an increase in marginal tax rate from 7 to 10%.1 Nonetheless, corporate inves-
tors (mainly IPO sponsors) are not affected by these tax changes. They are subjected to 
a corporate tax rate during the respective fiscal years. This favourable tax regime would 
prevail until the end of 2016.
Malaysia’s REITs dividend tax cut announcements provide a cleaner test to examine 
the economic impact of dividend policy due to the following reasons. First, similar to the 
2003 Act, the magnitude of the dividend tax changes is significant at 18%. Second, unlike 
the 2003 Act which saw the reduction of both dividend and capital gain tax rates across 
all sectors in the US, Malaysia’s dividend tax cuts are uniquely applied to listed and private 
REITs (property trust funds). The first announcement made in 2006 was, however, con-
founded with a change in taxes at the REITs level where the undistributed income of REITs 
is exempted from corporate tax as long as REITs distribute at least 90% of their taxable 
income. Prior to this, undistributed income is subjected to corporate tax. Third, there were 
many announcements (noises), debates and negotiations leading to the passing of the 2003 
Act into law. Auerbach and Hassett (2005), who used event study methodology to measure 
the abnormal returns surrounding the 2003 Act announcements, resorted to eight event 
dates that track the release of significant news concerning the likelihood passage of the 
2003 Act. On the contrary, dividend tax cut announcements made during the tabling of 
the Malaysian budgets were relatively clean events.
We also contribute to the theoretical argument in dividend tax literature as to whether 
changes in dividend tax affect firm valuation, investment and dividend payout policies. 
The “traditional view” of dividend tax theory posits a positive impact of dividend tax cuts 
on these corporate policies through the reduction of firms’ cost of capital. In contrast, the 
“new view” posits that dividend tax cuts have no impact on firms’ cost of capital; hence, 
they do not influence firms’ investment and dividend policies. Empirical relevance of these 
views has implication on whether regulators should introduce tax-exempt REIT structure 
or extend the dividend tax concession to existing REITs in the market. On one hand, div-
idend tax concession clearly results in large losses in tax revenue to the government. On 
the other hand, REIT structure could enhance the transparency and liquidity of the real 
estate market that could benefit the economy at large.2 Our estimation shows that it costs 
the Malaysian government more than RM306 million over the first six years (2007–2012) 
of its implementation.3
The empirical tests are carried out in two stages. First, an event study is conducted to 
examine the dividend tax cut announcement effects. Regression analysis of the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) against firm level characteristics is then executed to reveal factors 
Table 1. Dividend taxes for Reit during the period 2006–2012.
notes: this table shows the changes in dividend taxes for different classes of investors during the period 2006–2016. source: 
Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia.
2006 (prior to dividend tax 
cut announcement) (%)
2007 (after the 1st divi-
dend tax cut) (%)
2009–2016 (after 2nd 







foreign individual 28 15 10
Domestic individual 28 (top rate) 15 10
corporate investors 28 27 25
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that drive the wealth effects of dividend tax cuts. Next, we examine the impact of tax cuts 
on REIT’s payout and investment policies. Our results reject the dividend tax irrelevance 
hypothesis as tax cut announcements are associated with positive CARs. Our cross-sectional 
analysis of CARs shows that the level of retail ownership in REITs is associated positively 
with CARs. We also find dividend tax cuts to exert positive (negative) impact on dividend 
payout (investment growth). Overall, these findings are broadly consistent with the tradi-
tional view of dividend taxation.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, a brief review of the lit-
erature is presented which is followed by the data and research methodology in the third 
section. The fourth section discusses the empirical results. The fifth section concludes the 
paper.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
There are three widely held views with respect to the effects of dividend reduction on equity 
value and firm behaviour. The “tax irrelevance view” postulates that dividend reduction has 
no impact on firm value, firms’ investment and payout policy. This view is valid when the 
marginal shareholder is a non-taxable entity such as pension fund or in a situation when 
taxable investors could find ways to compensate the higher dividend taxes as compared to 
capital gain taxes (Miller & Scholes, 1978, 1982). Miller and Scholes (1978), for example, 
used the nuances in the US tax code to explain why marginal investors do not require extra 
pre-tax returns to hold dividend paying securities.
The “new view” of dividend taxation, developed by Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981) 
and King (1977), postulates that dividend tax cut has a positive impact on share value as it 
leads to a one off windfall to shareholders. This wealth transfer, however, does not change a 
firm’s cost of capital, hence, has no effect on firm’s dividend payout and investment policies. 
The assumption underlying this prediction is the availability of retained earnings to finance 
new investment.4 From the policy point of view, this implies that dividend tax changes will 
not distort firm’s investment and payout policies.
Similar to the new view, “traditional view” of dividend taxation predicts share price to 
react positively to dividend tax cut announcements. Firms in traditional view are charac-
terized by their reliance on new equity financing for investment and the need to distribute 
dividends to equity holders. Reduction in dividend taxes is theorized to have a positive 
impact on firms’ investment and payout policies through the reduction in firms’ cost of 
capital. According to the traditional view, dividend tax cuts reduce the cost of using dividend 
payment as a tool to signal firm quality and to curb agency problems. Hence, increase the 
dividend payout ratio.5 From policy-makers’ viewpoint, dividend tax cut could be a fiscal 
tool to stimulate investment and dividend payout ratio.
Empirical evidence on the impact of dividend taxation on firm value and corporate 
financial policies are relatively scant because major tax reforms are uncommon.6 Auerbach 
and Hassett (2005) found support for the value creation of the 2003 dividend tax cuts 
by using event study methodology. They noted that high-yielding firms registered higher 
abnormal returns than their low-yielding counterparts. In similar vein, Amromin et al. 
(2005) provided visual evidence (line graphs) of positive abnormal returns surrounding 
the 2003 dividend tax cut announcements.
4   W.-C. WONG ET AL.
Poterba and Summers (1984) examined the impact of three dividend tax reforms on stock 
prices in Britain in the year 1958, 1964 and 1971. The authors postulated that reduction 
in dividend taxes should, ceteris paribus, increase the attractiveness of high-yielding firms 
relative to low-yielding firms. They found support for this hypothesis where the reduction 
in dividend taxes in 1958 and 1971 led to higher excess returns of those high-yield shares. 
A later study by Bell and Jenkinson (2002) on the impact of dividend tax reform in the UK 
in 1997 echoed the above finding. Bell and Jenkinson documented significant drop in the 
valuation of dividend income following the tax reform which saw withdrawal of dividend tax 
credit for tax exempt investors. The drop in valuation is more pronounced for high-yielding 
firms that are largely held by tax exempt investors.
Poterba and Summers (1983) found dividend tax cuts to exert a positive influence on 
firms’ investment policy in the UK, which is consistent with the prediction of the tradi-
tional view paradigm. Desai and Goolsbee (2004), however, provided strong support to 
the new view of dividend taxation where they showed that the 2003 dividend tax cut in the 
US had no effect on investment growth. A more recent study by Frank, Singh, and Wang 
(2012) documented another perspective of dividend tax cuts on firm level investment that 
relied on firms’ cash holdings (cash-to-asset ratio). Dividend tax cuts tend to boost firm 
level investment of those cash constrained firms but reduce the investment of those cash 
rich firms. Chetty and Saez (2005) provided clear evidence of a surge in the frequency and 
amount of dividends following dividend tax cuts which is consistent with the traditional 
view’s prediction. Wang and Guo (2011) echoed this traditional view of dividend taxation 
with evidence from listed companies in China when there was a reduction from 20 to 10% 
on individual investors’ dividend tax rate, effective 13 June 2005. They documented that 
China’s dividend tax cut in 2005 led firms to increase their dividend payment.
In real estate, Gentry, Kemsley, and Mayer (2003) found that investors capitalized divi-
dend tax saving from depreciation tax shield into share prices. Specifically, the book value 
of real estate properties, a proxy for tax basis in asset, is associated positively with the 
market value of common equity. Since REITs do not pay corporate taxes, the authors infer 
this finding as “equivalent to finding investors price shareholder-level dividend taxes”. In 
other words, the authors argue that this finding has the same implication as in stock price 
changes following dividend taxes changes as discussed above. Edgerton (2010) who exam-
ined the 2003 dividend tax cuts in the US documented that dividend payout by REITs also 
rose sharply following the tax cut, even though REITs dividends did not qualify for the 
tax cut. The author relates this counter-intuitive finding with contemporaneous increases 
in earnings and investor demand for high dividend payout that it has nothing to do with 
dividend tax cut event.
REITs’ institutional structure allows us to better distinguish between the traditional and 
new views of dividend taxation for the following reasons. First, REITs are cash-constrained 
entities that rely heavily on external financing due to its mandatory 90% distribution require-
ment.7 This fits well into the traditional view description of dividend taxation theory which 
assumes equity financing rather than retained earnings in financing new investment. The 
mandatory dividend payout policy of REITs, according to the traditional view, is likely to 
amplify the impact of dividend tax changes on REITs than other general companies that pay 
lower or do not intend to pay dividends. Second, as stated by Gentry et al. (2003), REITs’ 
non-discretionary dividend distribution requirement reduces managers’ incentive to use 
dividend as a signalling tool and eliminate the tax benefit associated with share repurchases 
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(since REITs do not pay corporate taxes) which lead to a cleaner test between dividend tax 
changes and share price returns.
The foregoing literature review leads to the following alternate hypothesis.
H1: REITs stock prices react positively to dividend tax cut announcements.
The validity of H1 will support both the new and traditional views but reject the dividend 
tax irrelevance view of dividend taxation. We further hypothesize the impact of tax cuts is 
muted for property companies that do not enjoy the dividend tax cuts.
H2: Property company stock prices do not respond to dividend tax cut announcements.
Since both foreign and domestic institutional investors are the main beneficiaries of these 
tax cuts, we, therefore, hypothesize that the announcement effects will increase monoton-
ically with the importance of these groups of shareholders represented by the number of 
shares owned by them. We also expect to observe a positive relationship between retail 
ownership and abnormal returns if majority of those individual investors, who are attracted 
to REITs shares, are high tax bracket individuals who experienced increases in after-tax 
returns upon the implementation of the tax reforms.
H3: Institutional and retail ownerships are positively related to abnormal returns from dividend 
tax cut announcements
As discussed earlier, the traditional view posits that reduction in dividend taxes could 
spur dividend distribution and business investment. The new view on the other hand posits 
that dividend tax changes do not affect firms’ investment and dividend policies. This leads 
to the following alternate hypothesis under traditional view paradigm.
H4: REITs’ dividend payout and investment increase after the implementation of dividend tax 
cut announcements.
3. Data and methodology
The primary data used in this research are obtained from Thomson Reuters’s database cov-
ering all listed Malaysian REITs over the period June 2006–September 2012. We use event 
study to examine the wealth effects surrounding the three dividend tax cut announcements 
made on 1 September 2006 (Event 1), 29 August 2008 (Event 2) and 7 October 2011 (Event 
3). We also replicate the test using universal of listed property companies in Malaysia for 
comparison purposes. The event date is taken as the first day the announcement appears 
during the tabling of 2007, 2009 and 2012 national budgets. The final sample comprises 
26 observations. Abnormal returns surrounding the dividend tax cut announcements are 
estimated using the standard market model where the abnormal return of firm i on day 
t(ARi,t) is:
 
where, Ri,t = return of firm i on day t, ?̂?i and 𝛽i = parameters estimated in the estimation 
period (−90 to −30)
The average abnormal return (AAR) of all firms on day t(AARt) is computed using the 
following formula:
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where, ARi,t = abnormal returns of firm i on day t, nt = number of observations of abnormal 
returns on day t





 using the market model is:
 
where, 2ei = variance of residuals of firm i from the market model estimation, n = number 
of observations of abnormal returns on day t
The significance of AARt is estimated as:
 


























2ei(t) = cumulative variance of residuals of firm i from the market model estima-
tion from day t1 until t2, n = number of observations of CARs on day t.
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Next, we examine the cross-sectional determinants of the CARs. The estimated OLS 



































































CARi = 1 + 2Retail Investorsi + 3ForeignInst.Investorsi + 4DomesticInst. Investorsi
+ i + Eventdummyi + uit
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Retail Investors, Foreign Inst. Investors and Domestic Inst. Investors are our key variables of 
interest. A positive and significant coefficient of ownership variables will establish a stronger 
causality between dividend tax changes and abnormal returns because only REITs, for whom 
retail and institutional investors are the main beneficiaries of the tax cut, will react positively 
to the tax cut announcements. We also include Event dummy, an indicator variable that 
equals to one for CARs that belong to Event 1 and Event 2 and zero for CARs in Event 3. 
Rather than estimating the event separately, we combined them due to the small sample 
size. To ensure the robustness of our results, we control for vector of firm-level controls (F) 
which include dividend yield, cash holding, firm size, firm age, profitability and leverage. 
Auerbach and Hassett (2005) found that firms with a higher dividend yield benefited more 
(high abnormal returns) from dividend tax cut announcements.
4. Results
Figure 1 tracks the mean CAARs, for the sample, over the corresponding 21-day window 
period. This figure provides preliminary results supporting H1 where stock prices increase 
following dividend tax cut announcements. The gradual rise of abnormal returns in days 
leading to Event1 and Event 2 suggests that the market could have predicted the impending 
tax cut announcements. As mentioned earlier, Event 1 is a joint test of the impact of divi-
dend and corporate tax (for undistributed profit) cut announcements. We, therefore, cannot 
attribute solely the positive abnormal returns to dividend tax cut. The extension of tax cut 
period for another five years during Event 3 did not receive a positive market response as 
in Event 1 and Event 2. This could be due to no release of new information to the market 
participants as compared to the first two events that saw a reduction in dividend taxes.
Figure 2 tracks the CAARs for property companies. The CAAR for Event 1 is negative 
and is on a downward trend during the 10 days prior to the event date. CAARs for Event 2 
experienced an increase in abnormal returns four day prior to the event date before declining 
marginally and stabilizing after the event date. As for Event 3, the CAARs hit its lowest point 
on the event date. A visual comparison of Figures 1 and 2 support H2 where the positive 

























Figure 1. caaRs of Reits surrounding dividend tax cut announcements.
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Table 2 reports the abnormal returns for the five-day period surrounding the dividend 
tax cut announcements. Consistent with the findings from Figures 1 and 2, Panel A shows 
that dividend tax cut announcements on day t = 0 for Events 1 and 2 resulted with signif-
icant positive AAR of .85 and 1.77%, respectively. The announcement of dividend tax cut 
extension (Event 3), however, does not yield any significant changes in prices. The cumu-
lative effect (CAAR) in Panel B is positive for all eight windows for Event 1 and Event 2 of 
which four event windows are significant. For property shares, both AAR and CAAR results 
are mostly negative. One plausible explanation for these negative abnormal returns is that 
investors are substituting property shares with REITs, particularly for property companies 
that carry an almost similar risks and returns profile as in REITs. The contradictory findings 
between REITs and property companies that operate in the same sector also suggest that 
the positive abnormal returns of REIT shares are unlikely to be driven by favourable macro 
factors that drive the property sector returns surrounding the event dates.
Next, we extend our event study analysis by examining cross-sectional factors that could 























Figure 2. caaRs of property companies surrounding dividend tax cut announcements.
Table 2. five-day abnormal returns surrounding dividend tax cut announcements.
notes: this table reports the three announcement effects on 1st september 2006 (event 1), 29th august 2008 (event 2) and 
7th october 2011 (event 3) on Reits and property companies in malaysia. event time is measured in days relative to the 
announcement date (0); *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
REIT Property company
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
Panel A
aaR (−2) .57% .50% −.30% −.30% 1.27%** −1.21%**
aaR (−1) −.34% −.72% −.41% −1.09%*** −.41% −1.02%*
aaR (0) .85%** 1.77%*** −.02% −.28 −1.34%** −.15%
aaR (1) .14% .34% −.28% −1.71%*** .73% .33%
aaR (2) −.47% .48% .12% .92%** .40% .45%
Panel B
caaR (−1, +1) .64% 1.39% −.71% −3.08%*** −1.01% −.86%
caaR (−2, +2) .74% 2.37%** −.89% −2.46%** .65% −1.41%
caaR (0, +1) .98%* 2.12%** −.30% −1.99%*** −.61% .29%
caaR (0, +2) .52% 2.59*** −.18% −1.07% −.21% .82%
no of obs. 4 10 12 67 68 71
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Table 3. The ownership measures and associated mean values are as follows: Retail Investors 
(6.8%), Foreign Inst. Investors (5.9%), Domestic Inst. Investors (23.6%) and Corporate 
Shareholders (50.0%). Approximately 97% (.49/.50) of the corporate shares are owned by 
REIT sponsors. The average REITs in our sample holds RM943 million worth of assets, 
has a 28.5% debt ratio and maintains a 6.3% cash holdings. The mean age of the REITs 
is 37 months, which confirms their lack of track record. The dividend yield and average 
profitability (ROA) are 8.29 and 7.8%, respectively.
Table 4 presents the results of the cross-sectional analysis between CARs and the own-
ership variables, event indicator and firm characteristic variables. The average variance 
inflation factor (VIF) for each of the regression model is 2.54, indicating that the variables 
are not highly correlated and that multicollinearity problem is not a threat to this study. 
Consistent with the results reported in Table 1 and Figure 1, Event 1 and Event 2 carry higher 
CARs as compared to Event 3 where the coefficients of Event dummy are significantly posi-
tive across all the regression models. The only significant institutional ownership variable is 
Domestic Inst. Investors which appeared in Model 2 while none of the coefficients of Foreign 
Inst. Investors and Domestic Inst. Investors are significantly related to CARs. The coefficients 
of Retail Investors are positive and significant in two out of four of the estimated models 
which is consistent with our expectation. Not reported here, we also experimented with 
two alternative measures of retail ownership: the percentage of shares held by shareholders 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for caR regression.
notes: this table provides summary statistics for the data employed in our analysis over the period 2006–2011. total num-
ber of observations is 26. REIT Age and REIT Size are in their natural logarithm form in the regression models.
Definition Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Dependent variable
CAR (−1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns for a 3-day 
window covering 1-day before and after 
the event date
.003 .022 −.042 .051
CAR (−2, +2) cumulative abnormal returns for a 5-day 
window covering 2-day before and after 
the event date
.006 .029 −.064 .062
CAR (0, +1) cumulative abnormal returns for a 2-day 
window covering 1-day after the event 
date
.008 .019 −.025 .049
CAR (0, +2) cumulative abnormal returns for a 3-day 
window covering 2-day after the event 
date
.010 .025 −.031 .056
control variables
Retail Investors the percentage of shares held by sharehold-
ers holding 100,000 or less Reit shares
.068 .053 .017 .215
Foreign Inst. Investors Percentage shares owned by foreign institu-
tional investors 
.059 .057 0 .200
Domestic Inst. Investors Percentage shares owned by domestic 
institutional investors
.236 .132 .070 .580
Corporate Shareholders Percentage shares owned by corporate 
shareholders
.500 .207 0 .772
Sponsor Ownership Percentage shares owned by iPo sponsors .487 .210 0 .765
Cash Holdings cash and short term investments scaled by 
total assets
.063 .131 .000 .682
Dividend Yield (%) Dividend per share scaled by share price 8.290 2.188 5.470 13.770
REIT Size total assets (millions Rm) 942.71 859.19 173.40 4,452.90
REIT Age (month) number of months from iPo date 36.54 23.08 5 75
ROA net income divided by total assets .078 .031 .029 .138
Leverage total debts divided by total assets .285 .100 .113 .454
10   W.-C. WONG ET AL.
holding 10,000 REIT shares and the natural logarithm of total number of shareholders 
in REITs. Higher values of these variables indicate a greater presence of small or retail 
investors in REITs. The coefficients for these variables are positive across all regression 
models as in Table 4 and are significant in one (for 10,000 shareholding) and three (total 
number of shareholders) of the four estimated models in Table 4. These findings suggest 
that REITs with a larger fraction of retail investors are more receptive towards dividend 
tax cut announcements.
We did not include Corporate Shareholders in the regression due to its high colline-
arity with domestic institutional ownership variables (pairwise:-.82).8 Cash holdings are 
positively related to CARs in three of the estimated models. This suggests that the stock 
market associates higher valuation to firms that have greater capacity to distribute dividend 
following the tax cuts. The significant negative coefficients of Dividend yield in Model 1 
does not concur with Auerbach and Hassett (2005)’s findings of high-yielding firms reacted 
positively to dividend tax cut. The coefficients for REIT Age and Leverage are positive and 
significant in Models 1 and 2, respectively, implying that older and more leveraged REITs 
are more receptive towards dividend tax cuts. Given the small sample size, these results are 
offered with caution.9
As a final analysis, we investigate whether dividend payout and investment increase 
following the implementation of dividend tax cuts. The average VIF of 2.90 and 2.88 for 
the respective Model 1 and 2 indicate that multicollinearity is not a concern. We use the 
same set of firm-level control variables as in Equation (9). In addition, we also control for 
year and property type fixed effects. Table 5 reports the results from ordinary least squares 
estimation using 204–205 firm-quarter observations. The dependent variable for Model 1 
is dividend payout ratio one year before and after the implementation of dividend tax cuts. 
For Model 2, the dependent variable is the change in total assets (representing investment) 
one year before and after the tax cut announcements. The key variable of interest is Tax 
Cuts, a binary variable equals to one for payout ratio or total assets growth during the first 
quarter after the implementation of dividend tax cuts and zero otherwise.
Table 4. Determinants of Reits’ caRs.
notes: this table reports result of ols regressions of abnormal returns surrounding dividend tax cut announcements on firm 
characteristic variables for a sample of 26 announcements. the dependent variables are caRs for 3–5 day event windows. 
t-statistics are reported in the parentheses with robust standard errors. ***, ** and * refer to statistical significance at 1, 
5 and 10 % respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CAR (−1, +1) CAR (−2, +2) CAR (0, +1) CAR (0, +2)
Intercept −.078 (−1.12) −.074 (−.68) −.071 (−.92) −.141 (−1.06)
Retail Investors .154 (1.60) .182 (1.31) .170* (2.05) .232* (1.92)
Foreign Inst. Investors .084 (.79) .130 (1.13) .105 (1.04) .097 (.75)
Domestic Inst. Investors .039 (1.15) .073* (1.99) .027 (.82) .036 (.57)
Cash Holdings .040* (1.76) .055* (1.84) .040* (2.06) .036 (1.34)
Dividend Yield −.006* (−2.02) −.005 (−1.31) −.000 (−.06) −.001 (−.18)
REIT Size −.003 (−.18) −.014 (−.38) .000 (.00) .019 (.55)
REIT Age .049** (2.55) .045 (1.49) .019 (1.07) .023 (.83)
ROA −.062 (−.32) −.146 (−.75) .007 (.04) −.008 (−.04)
Leverage .047 (.93) .110* (1.89) .020 (.45) .036 (.53)
Event Dummy .060*** (3.44) .070** (2.91) .037** (2.34) .049** (2.41)
adjusted R2 .20 .21 .25 .03
no of obs. 26 26 26 26
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The results are revealing. First, the coefficients of Tax Cuts are positive in the payout 
equation but negative in the investment equation. This implies that REITs’ payout increases 
following the tax cuts, which is in line with the prediction of the traditional view paradigm. 
However, the decrease of investment growth following the tax cut runs contrary to the pre-
diction of the traditional view and it is also inconsistent with the new view that predicts no 
impact of tax cuts on investment activity. We could think of two plausible explanations for 
the negative coefficients of Tax Cuts in the investment equation. First, the results could be 
explained by lack of investible properties during the period immediately after the tax cuts. 
Recall that the second and third announcements made in 2008 and 2011 coincided with 
heightening of global financial crisis and the European debt crisis, respectively. Second, 
unlike firms with no mandatory payout requirements, REITs need to juggle between paying 
higher dividends and reserving funds for future investment following the tax reforms. Our 
results suggest the opposing effects of dividend tax cuts on payout and investment policies. 
Not reported here, we also conducted robustness check by changing the definition of tax 
cuts dummy to equal to one for the first two quarters before and after the implementation 
of tax cuts and zero otherwise. The tax cuts variable remains positive and significant at the 
5% level in the payout equation. This variable is negative but insignificant (t-value: −1.38) 
in the investment equation.
The negative and significant coefficients of ROA and REIT Age in the payout equation 
suggest that young and less profitable REITs pay a higher dividend than their older and 
profitable counterparts. These counter-intuitive findings suggest that young and less prof-
itable firms may face higher signalling costs (via dividend payments) in convincing the 
market of their credibility. The positive and significant coefficients of ROA and REIT Size 
in the investment equation suggest that profitable and larger REITs have more capacity to 
increase their portfolio size. Overall, the regression results provide partial support to the 
traditional view paradigm of dividend taxation where only payout but not investment policy 
of REITs is influenced positively by dividend tax cuts.
Table 5. the impact of divided payout and asset growth.
notes: this table reports result of ols regressions of dividend payout and asset growth surrounding dividend tax cut an-
nouncements on firm characteristic variables, property type and year dummies for a sample of 205 (204) firm-quarter 
observations for the period of 2006–2012. the dependent variable for model 1 is dividend payout ratio one year before 
and after the implementation of dividend tax cuts. for model 2, the dependent variable is the change in total assets one 
year before and after the tax cut announcements. Tax Cuts is a binary variable equals to one for payout ratio or total assets 
growth during the first quarter after the implementation of dividend tax cut and zero otherwise. t-statistics are reported 
in the parentheses with robust standard errors. ***, ** and * refer to statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 %, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 
Dividend payout Asset growth
Intercept 1.358*** (4.34) −.280 (−1.17)
Tax Cuts .098*** (3.00) −.022** (−2.09)
Cash Holdings .665 (1.21) −.041 (−.77)
Dividend Yield −.012 (−1.06) −.002 (−.51)
REIT Size .017 (.34) .049* (1.77)
REIT Age −.150* (−1.70) .040 (.74)
ROA −.886*** (−7.91) .960*** (8.02)
Leverage −.222 (−1.13) .249* (1.81)
Property types dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
adjusted R2 .57 .10
no of obs. 205 204
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5. Conclusion
This paper adds to the scarce literature on the impact of dividend taxation changes on firm 
financial policies. Malaysian dividend tax cut announcements which are uniquely applied 
to the REIT sector allows us to circumvent the issues of confounding effects (e.g. concurrent 
capital gain tax announcements) faced by previous research. Our results show that dividend 
tax cut announcements lead to positive abnormal returns for REITs. However, we do not 
observe positive abnormal returns for property companies that did not enjoy these tax cuts. 
We also find evidence of increase in REITs’ payout ratio following the implementation of 
dividend tax cuts which is consistent with the prediction of the traditional view paradigm.
Three significant implications could be drawn from this study. First, the positive abnor-
mal returns registered by REITs suggest that dividend tax cuts are welcome by the stock 
market. Findings of stronger announcement effects on REITs with a higher retail ownership 
suggest that this tax cut might result in a higher retail participation in the REIT sector. High 
payout following the tax cuts could lead to a higher consumer spending and economic 
growth. These imply that dividend tax cuts are beneficial to corporations and society at large. 
We, however, find a negative impact of dividend tax cuts on firm investment which clouded 
the efficiency gain from a tax reform as postulated in the traditional view of dividend tax-
ation. Second, the negative tax announcement effects on property companies suggest that 
some property companies could have become less attractive to investors following these 
tax reforms. Policy-makers in their efforts to increase the popularity of REIT sector need to 
keep a close watch on potential cannibalization of the market shares of property companies 
that are close substitutes of REIT shares, particularly those that carry a risk-return profile 
similar to REITs (e.g. high rental income).
Third, the dividend tax reforms have in fact increased the dividend taxes of individual 
REIT investors with taxable income less than RM 35,000. Our computation reveals that the 
average Malaysian household faced a marginal tax rate of 7% which is lower than the 10% 
rate after the reforms. This implies that individual REIT shareholders in this tax bracket 
in fact suffer a 3% reduction in their after-tax returns following the tax reforms. Instead 
of making REIT shares accessible to all individual investors, this tax reform could actually 
make REITs less attractive to the lower income earners. Policy-makers need to take this 
disparity in dividend taxation between different classes of investors into consideration when 
a review of dividend tax rate is due by the end of 2016.
Notes
1.  Households with taxable income of RM35,000, on average, carry a gross income of RM52,000 
(based on RM17,000 tax exemptions in 2006) (http://www.hasil.gov.my/pdf/pdfam/
NP_BE2006_1.pdf. Accessed on 18 April 2016) which is 33% higher than average gross 
income of RM39,000 for average householders in 2005 in Malaysia (http://www.epu.gov.
my/documents/10124/fec5c411-a97c-491b-b9a5-e28cd227ac95. Accessed on 18 April 2016).
2.  One of the factors that hamper the implementation of REIT structure in China is the reluctant 
on the part of the government to let go their lucrative real estate tax revenue (RICS, 2016). 
Similarly, regulators in South Korea and Hong Kong still impose corporate taxes on REITs 
albeit lower (for Hong Kong) than the general companies.
3.  This is based on total tax savings enjoyed by retail and institutional investors, computed by 
multiplying average non-corporate shareholders ownership (50%) with gross dividend and 
dividend tax rate reduction, i.e. 13% (28–15%) for 2007–2008; 18% (28–10%) for 2009–2012.
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4.  See Zodrow (1991) for theoretical discussion on how the effective rate of taxation of investment 
financed with retained earnings is independent of individual dividend tax rate in the new 
view model.
5.  Again, readers are referred to Zodrow (1991) for theoretical discussion on how decreases in 
dividend tax tend to increase dividend payout rate and investment growth in the traditional 
view model.
6.  One strand of literature exploit the difference in dividend (high) and capital gain (low) taxes 
to infer the share price effects of dividend taxes. Fama and French (1998) examined the 
relationship between the market value of assets and dividends. A negative coefficient on 
dividend would support the hypothesis that investors imposed a tax penalty on dividend 
paying firms. The authors did not find support for this hypothesis. Green and Rydqvist (1999) 
provided support on the tax penalty by showing dividend taxes resulted in less-than-dollar-
for-dollar decline in share prices on ex-dividend days.
7.  Ott, Riddiough, and Yi (2005) documented that only 7% of the US REITs’ investments are 
funded by retained earnings, as compared to 70% usage of retained earnings by general 
firms. REITs frequently return to the capital market for external financing due to their capital 
constraint status (Ooi, Wong, & Ong, 2012).
8.  Nevertheless, in order to ensure our result is robust, an analysis is executed by replacing the 
institutional variables with Corporate Shareholders, but they are not reported here. Results 
show that none of the coefficients of Corporate Shareholders are significantly related to CARs.
9.  Normality tests reveal that the residuals for all regression models in Table 4 are normally 
distributed. The coefficients for the ownership variables remain intact in the estimation 
models without firm characteristic variables.
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